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coercive questioning (that is, where a suspect's silence can be used in evidence against him or her) can be used in matters under s (as amended) of the Official Secrets Act 1911. There are also wide powers under the Companies Act 1985 to require officers and agents of companies to assist inspectors appointed to investigate the company. Refusal to answer questions can be sanctioned as a contempt of court 431) and as a criminal offence 447). A person can also be required to answer questions to him or her by a acceptances of them under the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986. The closest English law comes to creating a duty to give one's name and address is the power given to the police under s 25(3) of PACE 1984 (above). Effective abolition of the right silence The Government ignored the recommendations of the Runciman Commission and, in ss 34-37 of the CJPO 1994, effectively abolished the right to silence. 'Abolished' may be too strong a word because everyone still has the right to remain silent in the same circumstances as they did before the 1994 Act; what has changed is the entitlement of a judge or prosecuting counsel to make adverse comment on such a silence. The issue has now been addressed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The leading case is Condron v UK [2000] Crim 679. In 2000, two convicted drug dealers won a landmark ruling in Europe that the UK Government's curbs on the right to silence denied them a fair trial. The ECtHR in Strasbourg stated that, where juries are allowed to draw adverse inferences from silence under police questioning, they must be properly directed by the judge. In a key finding, it ruled that the Court of Appeal should look not just at whether a conviction was 'safe', but also at whether a defendant received a fair trial. The ruling will be likely to lead to other appeals. The case, backed by Liberty, the human rights group, was brought by William and Karen Condron, who were convicted of supplying drugs in 1995. The pair, who did not answer police questions, were jailed for four years. The ECtHR said that the jury had not been properly directed. As a result, the couple's right to a fair trial, as guaranteed by Art 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, was breached. It awarded each defendant £15,000. Silence could not be regarded as 'an absolute right', the court said, and drawing inferences was not itself in breach of the right to a fair trial, but caution was needed. The jury should have been directed that, ' .. .if it was satisfied that the applicants' silence...could not sensibly be attributed to their having no answer, or none that would stand up to cross-examination, it should not draw an adverse inference'. The law report from Times appears below.
DOI link for coercive questioning (that is, where a suspect's silence can be used in evidence against him or her) can be used in matters under s (as amended) of the Official Secrets Act 1911. There are also wide powers under the Companies Act 1985 to require officers and agents of companies to assist inspectors appointed to investigate the company. Refusal to answer questions can be sanctioned as a contempt of court 431) and as a criminal offence 447). A person can also be required to answer questions to him or her by a acceptances of them under the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986. The closest English law comes to creating a duty to give one's name and address is the power given to the police under s 25(3) of PACE 1984 (above). Effective abolition of the right silence The Government ignored the recommendations of the Runciman Commission and, in ss 34-37 of the CJPO 1994, effectively abolished the right to silence. 'Abolished' may be too strong a word because everyone still has the right to remain silent in the same circumstances as they did before the 1994 Act; what has changed is the entitlement of a judge or prosecuting counsel to make adverse comment on such a silence. The issue has now been addressed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The leading case is Condron v UK [2000] Crim 679. In 2000, two convicted drug dealers won a landmark ruling in Europe that the UK Government's curbs on the right to silence denied them a fair trial. The ECtHR in Strasbourg stated that, where juries are allowed to draw adverse inferences from silence under police questioning, they must be properly directed by the judge. In a key finding, it ruled that the Court of Appeal should look not just at whether a conviction was 'safe', but also at whether a defendant received a fair trial. The ruling will be likely to lead to other appeals. The case, backed by Liberty, the human rights group, was brought by William and Karen Condron, who were convicted of supplying drugs in 1995. The pair, who did not answer police questions, were jailed for four years. The ECtHR said that the jury had not been properly directed. As a result, the couple's right to a fair trial, as guaranteed by Art 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, was breached. It awarded each defendant £15,000. Silence could not be regarded as 'an absolute right', the court said, and drawing inferences was not itself in breach of the right to a fair trial, but caution was needed. The jury should have been directed that, ' .. .if it was satisfied that the applicants' silence...could not sensibly be attributed to their having no answer, or none that would stand up to cross-examination, it should not draw an adverse inference'. The law report from Times appears below.
coercive questioning (that is, where a suspect's silence can be used in evidence against him or her) can be used in matters under s (as amended) of the Official Secrets Act 1911. There are also wide powers under the Companies Act 1985 to require officers and agents of companies to assist inspectors appointed to investigate the company. Refusal to answer questions can be sanctioned as a contempt of court 431) and as a criminal offence 447). A person can also be required to answer questions to him or her by a acceptances of them under the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986. The closest English law comes to creating a duty to give one's name and address is the power given to the police under s 25(3) of PACE 1984 (above). Effective abolition of the right silence The Government ignored the recommendations of the Runciman Commission and, in ss 34-37 of the CJPO 1994, effectively abolished the right to silence. 'Abolished' may be too strong a word because everyone still has the right to remain silent in the same circumstances as they did before the 1994 Act; what has changed is the entitlement of a judge or prosecuting counsel to make adverse comment on such a silence. The issue has now been addressed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The leading case is Condron v UK [2000] Crim 679. In 2000, two convicted drug dealers won a landmark ruling in Europe that the UK Government's curbs on the right to silence denied them a fair trial. The ECtHR in Strasbourg stated that, where juries are allowed to draw adverse inferences from silence under police questioning, they must be properly directed by the judge. In a key finding, it ruled that the Court of Appeal should look not just at whether a conviction was 'safe', but also at whether a defendant received a fair trial. The ruling will be likely to lead to other appeals. The case, backed by Liberty, the human rights group, was brought by William and Karen Condron, who were convicted of supplying drugs in 1995. The pair, who did not answer police questions, were jailed for four years. The ECtHR said that the jury had not been properly directed. As a result, the couple's right to a fair trial, as guaranteed by Art 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, was breached. It awarded each defendant £15,000. Silence could not be regarded as 'an absolute right', the court said, and drawing inferences was not itself in breach of the right to a fair trial, but caution was needed. The jury should have been directed that, ' .. .if it was satisfied that the applicants' silence...could not sensibly be attributed to their having no answer, or none that would stand up to cross-examination, it should not draw an adverse inference'. The law report from Times appears below.
ABSTRACT
Breach over direction on silence ofaccused Before J-p Costa, President, and Judges Sir Nicolas Bratza, L Loucaides, P Kuris, W Fuhrmann, HS Greve and K Traja. Section Registrar: S Dolle [Judgment May 2, 2000] The European Court of Human Rights held unanimously that a trial judge had not properly directed the jury on the issue of the applicants' silence during police interview and as a consequence the applicants did not receive a fair trial within the meaning of article 6.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights.