him. The House of Lords subsequently restored the previous presumption, stating that, although they recognised the problem, they thought it was a matter for Parliamentary action rather than judicial intervention. R R (1991), Court of Appeal and House of Lords The defendant married his wife in 1984. In 1989 the wife left the matrimonial home and returned to live with her parents, informing the defendant of her intention to petition for divorce. While the wife was staying at her parents' house, the defendant forced his way in, attempted to have sexual intercourse with her, and assaulted her. He was charged on indictment with attempted rape and assault occasioning actual bodily harm and found guilty on both charges. He later appealed against his conviction for attempted rape.

doi:10.4324/9781843143451-42

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him. The House of Lords subsequently restored the previous presumption, stating that, although they recognised the problem, they thought it was a matter for Parliamentary action rather than judicial intervention. R R (1991), Court of Appeal and House of Lords The defendant married his wife in 1984. In 1989 the wife left the matrimonial home and returned to live with her parents, informing the defendant of her intention to petition for divorce. While the wife was staying at her parents' house, the defendant forced his way in, attempted to have sexual intercourse with her, and assaulted her. He was charged on indictment with attempted rape and assault occasioning actual bodily harm and found guilty on both charges. He later appealed against his conviction for attempted rape.

Chapter

him. The House of Lords subsequently restored the previous presumption, stating that, although they recognised the problem, they thought it was a matter for Parliamentary action rather than judicial intervention. R R (1991), Court of Appeal and House of Lords The defendant married his wife in 1984. In 1989 the wife left the matrimonial home and returned to live with her parents, informing the defendant of her intention to petition for divorce. While the wife was staying at her parents' house, the defendant forced his way in, attempted to have sexual intercourse with her, and assaulted her. He was charged on indictment with attempted rape and assault occasioning actual bodily harm and found guilty on both charges. He later appealed against his conviction for attempted rape.

ABSTRACT

Lord Lane CJ: The question which the judge had to decide was whether in those circumstances, despite her refusal in fact to consent to sexual intercourse, the wife must be deemed by the fact of marriage to have consented. The argument before us has ranged over a wider field and has raised the question whether there is any basis for the principle, long supposed to be part of the common law, that a wife does by the fact of marriage give any implied consent in advance for the husband to have sexual intercourse with her; and secondly, the question whether, assuming that principle at one time existed, it still represents the law in either a qualified or unqualified form.