ABSTRACT
The CBD acknowledges sovereign rights of states over their natural resources including GRs. User states are obliged to share the benefits derived from the utilization of GRs with states providing the GRs. Thus, provider states and user states are expected to create bilateral exchange relationships. Legal practice on international and national levels has proved that this individualistic approach lacks efficiency: while the scope and content of sovereign rights of provider states over their GRs are farreaching, due to the territoriality principle they are hampered to control the downstream process of value creation. Enforcing their legal powers effectively would also cause high transaction costs. User states, on the other hand, could be asked to make leeway. While they are less hindered by the territoriality principle because research and development (R&D) activities related to GRs are largely under their jurisdiction, they also face substantial transaction costs if they use what powers they have in order to control the upstream process. However, even if the control by provider and user states is improved, questions of distributional justice arise. Many GRs have a geographical range shared by regions of states, suggesting that benefits should be shared among all states in which the GR is endemic instead of the first provider state taking all of the share. Therefore, for reasons of efficiency and justice, I propose regional common pools for GR management. They are meant not to replace but to complement bilateralism. This chapter outlines structures and functions of common pools and suggests national legislation supporting them. The focus is on GRs as such and leaves common pools of TK associated with GRs for further reflection.
