ABSTRACT
On 11 June 2008 another outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) was reported in Hong Kong – the site of the first reported human deaths from this virus in 1997. Media reports portrayed the possibility of a major catastrophe. Anxious citizens stopped eating chicken. With China hosting the Olympics in a matter of weeks, concerns were raised in the highest circles about the consequences of an outbreak, for world profile and for business. Politicians wanted firm action. On 20 June, officials proposed a package of US$128 million for market restructuring which would put the small-scale poultry sector and wet markets out of business. Traders rejected the proposal and many consumers argued that the alternative frozen supermarket chickens were not what they wanted. Others argued that attempts at regulating imports and banning wet markets would be futile. Informal, unregulated trade abounds, and with South China being a known, if poorly reported, hot spot of avian influenza virus circulation, the chances of keeping Hong Kong free of the disease were very small indeed. Yet, sceptics argued that the proposed measures were more about political grandstanding and public relations than sensible, science-based control policies. The net consequences for the livelihoods of farmers, traders and poorer consumers would be negative, they argued, with only the well-connected large suppliers and supermarkets benefiting. But, given the fears around viral mutation into a form capable of efficient human-to-human transmission, others concluded that precaution, even if drastic, would be the most appropriate route. 1
