ABSTRACT
Although the U.S. military has withdrawn from Iraq, Iraq continues to face one of the most acute displacement crises in the world (IRC 2011). Over 5 million Iraqis have been displaced by violence, with 2.7 million of them internally displaced within Iraq (Younes and Rosen 2008). Such a situation creates not only a humanitarian crisis but also an opportunity for insurgents and militia groups to exploit the displacement crisis in order to legitimate themselves and achieve geopolitical goals. Consequently, the problem of displacement and the search for a solution to the current crisis—once salient issues for military commanders conducting counterinsurgency operations—will now be left to Iraqi authorities. The goals and challenges of a sovereign Iraq, however, will be largely the same as those faced by the military commanders who once toiled there. As the U.S. Army Field Manual 3–24, Counterinsurgency, states:
Long-term success in [counterinsurgency] depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government’s rule. Achieving this condition requires the government to eliminate as many causes of the insurgency as feasible…. Over time, counterinsurgents aim to enable a country or regime to provide the security and rule of law that allow establishment of social services and growth of economic activity. [Counterinsurgency] thus involves the application of national power in the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure fields and disciplines (U.S. Army 2006, 13). 1
