ABSTRACT
At the beginning of this book, Hasegawa illustrated how the Fukushima nuclear accident was a structural disaster highly associated with system failure. First of all, Japan’s energy insecurity and national defence demands have made nuclear power a favourable option for the government and citizens. With the government being the main agent promoting nuclear plants, safety regulations were therefore compromised by political expediency. The verdicts in court also left very little room for the general public or local community to demand greater government scrutiny via nuclear regulation. Furthermore, Japan’s closed political system also undermined public monitoring because the fiscal budget for nuclear energy was a black box with tax-inclusive grants covering the cost of public risk and the disposal of nuclear waste as a by-product of nuclear energy in the name of ‘compensation for inconveniences’. The independence of the atomic monitoring agency was seriously weakened, for METI was both the primary regulator and the supporter of nuclear plants. With a strong nuclear village championed by a closed system, risk culture and risk awareness have long been overlooked by overconfident technocrats in METI, and the precautious system of tsunami and system-blackout was never seriously discussed.
