ABSTRACT
This chapter formulates the generalization argument — like the version of comprehensive utilitarianism and focuses on the collective consequences that jointly result from everyone's doing x. The chapter also presents the satisficing theories assert that, in making decisions, people do not, and satisficing moral theories assert that, in making decisions, people and their policies should not seek the best alternative, but limit themselves to what seems good enough. People may also be led by reasons of moral expediency, in which case, even though not selfish, their aims — for example the chapter explains, in upholding of individuals' or firms' fishing rights or the avoidance of oceanic pollution defined by UNCLOS III — are treated as if they were overriding and above critical scrutiny. The chapter discusses the kinds, scope, and limits of ethical theories which offer grounds for formulating this framework, in particular, the general evaluation criteria and order of precedence they have depending on three parameters.
