ABSTRACT
Epistemic conservatism, the view that having a belief confers some positive epistemic status on the content of that belief, has many purported benefits. However, epistemic conservatism appears to conflict with the most widely held, and plausible, view of the basing relation—basing is a causal relation. According to causal accounts of the basing relation, in order for S’s belief that p to be justified it must be caused by justifying evidence in the appropriate way. It might seem obvious that epistemic conservatism is inconsistent with such accounts of the basing relation. After all, how can a belief cause itself? In this chapter I argue that the appearance of conflict between epistemic conservatism and causal accounts of the basing relation arises from a misunderstanding of epistemic conservatism. Once epistemic conservatism is properly understood the apparent conflict with causal accounts of the basing relation dissipates.
