ABSTRACT
Synopsis In the preceding chapter, we examined Reid’s theory of the moral faculty. The moral faculty yields an output of moral conceptions and judgements in response to the input of the contemplation of an action. Thus, the moral faculty does not respond to feeling or sensations but to an intentional object, a contemplated action. The output is determined by how we conceive of an action and, therefore, experience and instruction will influence the output of moral judgement. Moral judgement is, however, immediate rather than the result of reasoning. Experience and instruction influence the input, how we conceive of an action, rather than the principles guiding the operation of the faculty which are original and innate. When we conceive of an action in a specific manner, the judgement as to whether the action is right or wrong results immediately from the principles of the moral faculty. The natural immediacy of these judgements suffices, moreover, to refute Hume’s theory affirming that justice is an artificial virtue.
