ABSTRACT
The founding fathers of the European Community recognized the importance of competitive markets for the achievement of an open and liberal economic union. To this end, they incorporated the notion of ‘undistorted competition’ into the Treaty of Rome as one of the fundamental objectives of the Community, together with basic competition rules as the means to achieve it. Antitrust enforcement has, however, always been uncertain in the Community, partly because the enforcement mechanism in the Treaty reflects many of the institutional flaws typical of the European regulatory tradition. The enforcing institution, the Commission, is a body of political appointees from each of the member states. Its substantive responsibilities cover the full range of areas in which the Community has been delegated power. It is not immune to political influence, both from the member states and within the Commission itself, and the degree of transparency in its decision-making is not sufficient to ensure public accountability. Moreover, most member states do not have a firmly rooted antitrust tradition. Rather, antitrust enforcement as a means of regulation is a relatively recent phenomenon through most of the Community. The old habits of direct government intervention in the economy, which remain from the era of nationalization, are evident in the Commission’s enforcement of competition laws. Factors other than competition-related criteria, particularly those related to social and industrial policy, are frequently considered by the Commission in its application of the antitrust rules.
