ABSTRACT
Evolutionary debunking arguments can be unnerving. This chapter offers a response to evolutionary debunking arguments on behalf of naturalist realists. But a firmly realist theory of content is consistent with a mind-dependent theory of reference and content-determination. Realists who think the Moral Twin-Earth (MTE) argument is no reason to abandon their semantic theories have no other reason not to avail themselves of this response exploiting the epistemic character of reference-determination. And if they do so avail themselves, they will have a metasemantic theory which makes it the case that moral terms refer only to those things to which they stand in an appropriate epistemic relation. David Hilbert's color theory provides a parallel. A first level of anthropocentrism is present insofar as different languages divide color space differently from one another. A second level of anthropocentrism comes into the picture because one has three kinds of color receptors, each sensitive to light within a certain range.
