ABSTRACT
In the preceding three chapters, I have argued that (1) the transnational dilemma has impelled the British state to alter its policy narratives explaining its presence in Afghanistan from one that was based on liberal-centric norms of collective security to one focused on a realist-centric national context; that (2) both of these two approaches to policy narratives created political pressures on the state’s ability to articulate its purpose in Afghanistan; that (3) both of these approaches produced a kind of disconnect between what was said about the policy and the requirements of strategy on the ground; (4) that strategic communication practices and processes have sought to avoid the communicative and strategic difficulties innate to the transnationalised policy at the heart of Britain’s collective security membership in Afghanistan by working to give communication a greater role in shaping Britain’s strategic direction; and (5) that narratives organised around principles agreeable to the Defence community have allowed the British state to partially heal the rifts between Government and Defence.
