ABSTRACT
A series of game-theoretical models for the evolution of, what in the folk literature has become known as, the “Confidence Artist” is presented. Con artists are assumed to be noncooperators who move between groups and “prey” on naive cooperators. Cooperators learn about con artists by either direct experience or via cultural transmission about the identity (or behavior) of such individuals. Three types of transmission rules about con artists are modeled: 1) transmission rate that is independent of the frequency of con artists in the metapopulation; 2) transmission such that cooperators, with some probability, can learn about particular con artists who have entered their group; and 3) a type of frequency dependent transmission such that cooperators can identify con artists in proportion to their frequency in the metapopulation.
In general, cultural transmission works against con artists by 1) decreasing the critical between-patch travel time to invade a metapopulation of cooperators or 2) decreasing the equilibrial frequency of con artists (compared to the case of no cultural transmission). Depending on the mode of cultural transmission, con artists may exist at relatively high or low frequencies.
