ABSTRACT
Of course, the nature of the relationship between feeling and thinking has been a matter of enduring interest to philosophers and psychologists. The issue is complex, and there is good reason to assume that the affect cognition interface involves flexible interactions between two intimately connected but dissociable systems (see Zajonc, 1 9 9 8 , for a review). For instance, affective reactions may result from cognitive appraisals (e.g., Ortony, Clore, 6r Collins, 1 9 8 8 ) or expectations (e.g., Wilson, Lisle, Kraft, δτ Wetzel, 1 9 8 9 ) . Alternatively, affective reactions may give rise to cogni tive processes that seek to generate post hoc explanations or rationaliza tions for these reactions (e.g.. Bem, 1 9 7 2 ; James, 1 8 8 4 ) . Of course, it may also be the case that affective and cognitive reactions proceed relatively independently (e.g., Zajonc, Pietromonaco, & Bargh, 1 9 8 2 ) . Each of these possibilities is interesting in its own right, and consideration of the full range of affectcognition relationships at play in intergroup contexts would undoubtedly shed considerable light on the nature of intergroup rela tions. However, in the present chapter, we wil l focus our attention spe cifically on the question of how the affective reactions that we experience in the real or imagined presence of outgroup members can come to influ ence our subsequent intergroup judgments and behaviors.
