This chapter focuses on the workings of bureaucratic politics in acquisition. A profound performance bias appears to have dominated bureaucracy in the post-Cold War transition, just as it had in the Cold War. The post-Cold War world lacks clear signposts to guide US defense policy. Policymakers do not know where to look for guidance or how to interpret what they see: where the challenges are, how they should be managed, and who should manage them. In this context, successive administrations have attempted changes in acquisition policy. With an evaporating Soviet threat, the Bush administration scaled back or left programs in development — the F-22 Advanced Tactical Fighter, B-2 stealth bomber, RAH-66 Comanche stealth helicopter, and strategic defense technologies. The Clinton administration brought new attempts to trim military forces. Secretary of Defense Aspin instigated a flurry of reviews, most significant among them, the Bottom-Up Review.