ABSTRACT
There are two distinct institutionalist literatures relevant to the comparison of legislatures, both of which have a basis in social choice theory. Firstly there is a macro-level institutional literature. This literature (which we may call the ‘Patterns of Democracy’ approach following Lijphart 1 ) deals with the constitutional features that define the terms under which legislatures make policy, such as the electoral systems and the existence of constitutional checks and balances. The second literature deals with the internal institutions of legislatures – the industrial organisation of legislatures so to speak – and covers such features as committee structure and the legislative agenda. As Martin 2 points out, these institutions are endogenous, and can always be changed by a legislative majority. Thus much of the micro-level literature attempts to explain why certain institutions are advantageous to legislative majorities, in terms of providing information, facilitating mutually beneficial cooperation or reducing transaction costs. We will argue from recent work in social choice theory that the macro-level constitutional features actually determine policy outcomes more closely than has been appreciated. That is to say, we can explain differences in legislative outputs in terms of the theory of bargaining under majority (or supermajority) rule.
