ABSTRACT
During the writing of this work, the issue of drug money became overshadowed by the greater scare of terrorism (against Western multinationals and against nations with a military presence in Islamic countries) and the concern about its financing. Does this mean a silent easing of the ‘war’ against drugs and drug money? Not necessarily and certainly not permanently, as is demonstrated by the ever-increasing DEA budget, reaching $1,9 billion in 2003.1 In Colombia, the war against drugs efforts have been stepped up again and combined with the fight against guerrillas, who have been declared terrorists (Ronderos, 2003). Given the history of this ‘Hundred Years War’ against drugs, and the way it has remained a steady component of the US foreign as well as its domestic crime-control policy, it is not very likely that the combat will be over soon. Indeed, a new pragmatic dualistic policy may emerge because of the war on terrorism, as it seems to be evolving in Afghanistan. As in the days of the Cold War and despite the severe governance problems in Afghanistan, the poppy-growing warlords may be left alone as long as they are the allies against the enemy – this time the still surviving Taliban resistance and Osama bin Laden’s allies. Opium revenues are not easily abandoned, as the history of the region has shown (Meyer, 2002). The old combination of drugs and money in wartime may again contribute to a tacit understanding: drug entrepreneurs siding against terrorism may be left alone; drug money flowing into the war chest of terrorists is proclaimed the worst-case scenario.
