ABSTRACT
This conclusion presents some closing thoughts on the key concepts discussed in the preceding chapters of this book. The book explores globally anti-realist arguments to the effect that one constructs the reality, rather than the way things are being independent of human cognition. It shows Wittgensteinian anti-realism, which rendered truth epistemic, to be untenable. The book considers the analogy of realism about persons to be a much more fruitful line of reflection, when thinking about religious realism, than drawing on issues arising from realism/anti-realism debates in science or metaphysics. It suggests that we are all implicit realists about other people and, if we failed to be, we could not have genuine ethical relationships where we acknowledged the dignity, autonomy and ethical demand of the other person. The book argues that a recent vogue for apophaticism did not avoid the very anthropomorphism that it attempted to avoid.
