ABSTRACT
There is a substantial recent literature (Dyzenhaus, 2001; May 2013) on supposed liberal aspects or elements in Hobbes’s theory of law. I have criticized interpretations that conjure up a liberal Hobbes from what he says about the natural law requirement of equity (CRISSP, 2015). Denying that Hobbes is a legal liberal, however, is compatible with saying that liberal jurisprudence can learn something from his theory of law. In this paper I suggest how relatively recent attempts to define serious crime and to give a basis for sentencing that reflects seriousness could be improved by the introduction of Hobbesian considerations. Paying attention to chapter 27 of Leviathan, I claim that Hobbes is a better source for a unitary account of serious crime than the highly influential work of von Hirsch and Jareborg (‘Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-Standard Analysis’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Spring, 1991), pp. 1–38). I then outline some apparatus for a more unitary account that reflects Hobbes’s insights without throwing out all of von Hirsch and Jareborg.
