ABSTRACT

The Idea of Phenomenology The Idea of Phenomenology, a collection of lectures originally delivered by Husserl in 1907, provides a simple introduction to his phenomenology. In this work, Husserl polemically identifies the whole of philosophy and science as previously practiced, together with commonsense, as expressions of the ‘natural attitude’. In contrast, he will define his own new science of philosophy. He states (1970, p. 13):

Thus far, it seems, the ‘natural attitude’ consists of an elaborate self-fulfilling prophecy. But (ibid., p. 14): ‘On the other hand, they also clash and contradict one another. They do not agree with one another…and their claim to be cognitions is discredited….’ What action do we now take? Do these contradictions cause us to question the ‘natural’ attitude? (ibid., p. 14):

Paradoxically, then, an apparent weakness becomes a source of strength (ibid., p. 14): ‘Thus, natural knowledge makes strides… the various sciences of the natural sort come into being and flourish.’ Under the auspices of the ‘natural’ attitude, in science or in commonsense, no distinction is acknowledged between the different ways in which objects are given to us, and their correspondingly different modes of being. For example, such a distinction is to be made within ‘perception’, between the part which is perceived, and the part which is contextually supplied. The relation between these parts is somewhat problematic, yet we never address it. We confound the two levels together, never seeing any difficulty in their relationship.