ABSTRACT
Few would disagree with the proposition that the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP), adopted by heads of state and government at the 2005 UN World Summit, has become a prominent feature in international debates about preventing genocide and mass atrocities and protecting the victims. Five years on from its adoption, RtoP boasts a Global Centre and network of regional affiliates dedicated to advocacy and research, a global coalition of nongovernmental organizations, an academic journal and book series, a research fund sponsored by the Australian government, and has spawned a range of offshoots including the ‘IRtoP’ (individual responsibility to protect) and ‘W2I’ (will to intervene) projects, focusing respectively on engaging individuals as agents of change and generating the political will to intervene to put an end to genocide and mass atrocities.1 More importantly, RtoP has made its way onto the international diplomatic agenda. On the one hand, by appointing Edward Luck as his Special Adviser and publishing a report on implementing the principle, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has con fronted the UN membership with the challenge of translating its 2005 commitment from ‘words to deeds’.2 This challenge was taken up by the General Assembly in 2009, when it agreed to give further consideration to the Secretary-General’s proposals and continue dialogue about implementing the RtoP.3 On the other hand, RtoP has become part of the diplomatic language of humanitarian emergencies, used by governments, international institutions, NGOs and independent commissions to justify behaviour, cajole compliance and demand international action. Governments making use of the principle have included Egypt (calling for an international force to protect the people of Gaza), Russia (justifying intervention in Georgia to prevent ‘genocide’ in South Ossetia) and India (reminding Sri Lanka of its responsibility to protect all populations under its care), all of whom were initially sceptical about it.4
