ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses issue in epistemology is the relationship between basing relations and inferences. It argues that errors about the relationship have led to some confusion about the nature of the basing relation. The chapter explores some closely related issues regarding the relationship between so-called propositional justification and doxastic justification. If propositional justifications need not include any sort of inference, then Basis appears mistaken in assuming that propositional justifications are reasons. One possible objection is that a propositional justification’s failing to specify an inference might make it a bad reason, but it is still a reason. John Turri offers his own solution to the counter-example of the jurors and Miss Proper he presents and suggests that it may offer an important insight into the nature of propositional justification. The solution Turri suggests, that of holding that some propositional justifications are not reasons, has the advantage of avoiding at least some of these difficulties and complexities.
