The Introduction presents the key arguments discussed in this book. The book’s central argument is that interventions have generated disastrous consequences in Somalia not just because of technical or implementation problems that are accidentally conducive to unexpected and undesirable outcomes. The problem lies with the interventions’ partisan genealogy, as instruments of conflict and order transformation. In this book, I conceptualise interventions as partisan instruments of interference (Jones, 2013; Malito, 2017; Sinno, 2015) intentionally aimed at supporting or subverting certain political projects and groups, considered either a threat or an opportunity in the new order formation. While capacity gaps have been mobilised to justify contemporary interventionism, the analysis of three phases of intervention in Somalia reveals indeed that the permanent logic of bridging the gap held the intrinsic (and not accidental) consequence of undermining the autonomy of the intervened state. What remains problematic is that interventions complicate existing claims for power and authority. It is this partisan and expansionist logic for transforming domestic orders that contributes to imposing limitations on the sovereignty of the target state.