Introduction

When Chairman Mao Zedong declared the founding of the People’s Republic of China and that the Chinese people had stood up on 1 October 1949 at the Tiananmen Gate the PRC was big but weak, recovering from the ruins of the Japanese war and civil war. At the turn of the 21st century, although the PRC achieved impressive economic growth two decades after it had adopted a reform and open policy in 1978, many Western analysts were still skeptical of China’s long-term, sustainable growth. Some even cautioned the possible collapse of China’s economy.1 Western scholars hotly debated “Does China matter?”2 Few thought of China as a global power; if China “did matter” it was regarded at most as a regional power. However, China has silenced most of its critics by achieving near double-digit

growth in the first decade of the 21st century. China has replaced Germany as the world’s largest exporter and the third largest economy; its GDP is expected to overtake Japan in 2010. Moreover, while the American and European economies have been badly battered by the financial tsunami of 2008, the PRC has been relatively unscathed and expected to recover first from the recession. China achieved an impressive 8.7 per cent economic growth in 2009. In fact, Western analysts expect China to play a leading role in global economic recovery. China also impressed the world by displaying its new generation weapons at the grand parade celebrating its 60th anniversary. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences claims that China’s military capability has surpassed Russia and become second only to the United States.3 China proved its advanced weapons capabilities by successfully

testing its missile interception system on 11 January 2010.4 It expects to have its own aircraft carriers within a decade and some Chinese military strategists suggest establishing overseas naval bases to protect sealanes essential to Chinese interests. When President Hu Jintao stood at the Tiananmen Gate sixty years after Chairman Mao’s historical speech and pronounced confidently that China “is standing tall and firm in the East,” the world has witnessed China’s dramatic rise from a big but feeble to a big and powerful state. Some China-watchers are alarmed by the speed and scale of China’s economic

growth and military modernization. They are also worried because China’s economic and military rise is not accompanied by political liberalization. The pace of democratization is slow, if not stalled, and the prospect of a civil and just society is dim. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has monopolized political power and oppressed opposition voices by jailing political dissidents5 and censoring the media including the Internet. China even attempts to restrict the inflow of Western democratic ideas and criticisms of its policies towards political dissidents and ethnic minorities by censoring the websites of Google and Yahoo. The CCP justifies its political monopoly by introducing the myth that political liberalization may inevitably lead to political and social chaos or dongluan, a situation least desirable to most Chinese. Beijing stresses that only the CCP can lead China to economic prosperity and restore its historical greatness. Despite uneven development between the coastal regions and the inner and western regions and the widening income gap between the rich and poor, the CCP has by and large maintained political and social stability. Sporadic social unrests in China’s poor and rural and minority regions were soon put down by the military police (wujing) without spreading to other regions. China’s growing middle and professional class, apparent benefactors of China’s open and reform policy, choose not to challenge the existing authoritarian regime. Moreover, Western analysts are alarmed by the rising nationalist and anti-

Western sentiments among the Chinese youths sparked by the alleged Westernbacked ethnic unrests in the Tibetan and Xinjiang regions. A book entitled China is Unhappy (Zhong guo bu gao xing) was published in March 2009 reflecting the mood of the radical youths.6 The book points out that China is unhappy because of Western interference in Chinese domestic affairs. China is unhappy because of unreasonable demands and pressures fromWestern countries especially the United States to sacrifice China’s own national interests to save the global economy during the financial crises. The book advocates that China must build up its own economic and military might, take a more aggressive stand towards Western challenges, and say no7 to unreasonable Western demands. There is no evidence that the book was published with blessings from Chinese officials. But given the fact that strict censorship normally imposes on sensitive political and foreign policy issues, the book apparently is not without support from the authorities. In fact, Beijing took firm positions resisting Western pressures to raise China’s greenhouse gas

emissions targets at the Copenhagen summit on global climate change in December 2009.8 Beijing also resists pressures to revaluate its currency and insists that the exchange value of Renminbi (RMB or yuan) will be adjusted according to changing national and global economic situations. Historically in modern China, rising Chinese nationalism has often led to aggressive foreign policy. Ironically, “China bashing” has been relatively subdued at the beginning of the

second decade of the 21st century when China has become more powerful, assertive and uncompromising. Indeed, there are increasing signs of “China flattery” among Western media and analysts. Compared to a decade ago, more countries including China’s neighbours tend to accept and accommodate China’s rise, although some countries such as South Korea, India and ASEAN states feel somewhat uneasy with an increasingly powerful China and adopt at the same time a policy of hedging against China. Countries tend to see China’s rise more as an opportunity to increase their trade and economic cooperation with China than as a threat to their national interests or security. Countries rich in natural and energy resources such as OPEC and African states, Brazil and Australia welcome China’s rise and its hunt for natural and energy resources as a counterbalance to American domination. African states welcome China’s financial and technical assistances which, unlike the Western and American aids, normally do not attach any political strings. They prefer the Chinese development model, the so-called “Beijing consensus”, over the Western or American model, the “Washington consensus”. Industrialized states such as Japan and European Union states desperately need the huge and booming Chinese market to keep up their exports while domestic demands remain weak. Some also welcome China’s rise as a political balance to or check on unilateral actions taken by the United States. Voices demanding China improve its human rights record have been rarely raised by Western officials at international organizations or diplomatic meetings with Chinese representatives. Instead, some Western analysts choose to overpraise China’s big economic success as well as social and political stability while downplaying the social cost, environmental and other problems caused by China’s rapid economic expansion.9 Many, however, “flatter” China with a clear purpose. They urge China to share more global responsibility by, for instance, contributing to global economic recovery by revaluating its currency RMB and participating actively in curbing the warming of global climate. As pointed out by Henry Kissinger in chapter one of this volume, the world cannot achieve the above without the participation and cooperation of China. Even China’s archrival the United States has begun to learn to live with a rising

China. President Barack Obama openly admitted that a rising China will not threaten other countries and that the US will not seek to “contain” China. In fact, Obama declared that “the rising of a strong and prosperous China can be a source of strength for the community of nations”.10 Both Kissinger and Ming Chan (chapter three) argue that cooperation between China, the world’s most populous

state, and the United States, the world’s most powerful state, will contribute to world peace. Chan in particular argues from the geopolitical perspective that, as the centre of global growth has switched from Europe to the Asia-Pacific, China and the United States, the two largest and most powerful states in the Pacific region, will play leading roles in future global development. Cooperation between China and the US will result in a “win-win” situation for the two countries. Nevertheless, not all American analysts are so positive about China’s rising. Edward Friedman (chapter two), using the traditional power transition theory, argues that a rising and increasingly aggressive China may threaten global security. This book, as the title suggests, deals with perceptions of a rising China from

various countries and regions. It focuses on perspectives and policies in the United States, Europe, Russia, Northeast Asia (Japan and Korea), Southeast Asia (ASEAN and Indonesia), South Asia (India), Australia, Brazil, Africa and the Middle East. Hong Kong and Macau’s perspectives of China’s rise as well as China’s responses to “China bashing” or “China flattery” are also examined. The last chapter, written by two Taiwan scholars, Shih Chih-yu and Chang Teng-chi, examines the China threat and other issues from an epistemological perspective. They argue that China studies among overseas Chinese (including Taiwanese) scholars, like their mainland counterparts, are political, China-centered and value-laden, each embedded in an epistemological context. As a result China scholars draw little respect from Western China scholars and their interpretations of Chinese global strategy in terms of PRC’s national conditions or Chinese culture are seriously criticized. As the subsequent chapters of this volume reveal, countries often hold ambiva-

lent attitudes towards China. In fact, different and contradictory perspectives often exist within a country or region. Many have mixed feelings towards a rising China. It oversimplifies the picture by drawing a line between “China bashing” and “China flattery”. A country or region’s perceptions of and policies towards a rising China are often affected by, among others, history, domestic politics, regional politics and bilateral relations with China. As pointed out by a number of contributors in this volume, the lack of mutual understanding often affects bilateral relations between China and other countries. One can hope that with China’s increasing participation and cooperation in global affairs, mutual understanding and trust between China and other countries will grow and misperceptions between them will decline. Is China’s rise a phenomenon with lasting effects or short-lived international

event in the 21st century? Is China too big to fall? Nobody can be sure. It is still an ongoing process which is subject to many uncertainties. China has been seeking wealth and power since its defeat by the Western powers in the 1840 OpiumWar. Its path to modernity and wealth was never smooth and is likely to be rocky in the future. Changes in Chinese domestic politics as well as regional and global environments may change the course of China’s development and, as a result,

the perceptions of China by its neighbours and other world actors. China’s rise will continue to be perceived as a threat by some countries or regions and an opportunity by some, but as both a threat and opportunity by many others.