ABSTRACT
The countries of Southeastern Europe (SEE) lag behind other European states in the process of consolidation of economy and democracy and accession to the European Union. While three countries joined the European Union (EU), Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 as laggards of the 2004 enlargement and Croatia in 2013, the remainder of the region remains excluded with no foreseeable accession date in sight. Furthermore, state dissolution and the legacy of violent conflict shaped the transformation in the former Yugoslavia, which included the need for a long period of reconstruction of the state and economy, and reconciliation between peoples. In addition to the dual political and economic transformation from communist rule and a planned economy to democracy and market liberalism, most countries of SEE, in particular the successor states of former Yugoslavia, are weak states with dysfunctional institutions, notwithstanding the considerable diversity among these states.1 These multiple challenges are crucial to explaining the delay in the EU integration process in the Western Balkan countries (WBC).2 The EU sought to account for these particularities with the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). However, in spite of the fact that the SAP was launched already 15 years
ago, the WBC are still far away from the full EU membership. After losing the momentum of change gained after the democratic revolution in Serbia and the second democratic revolution in Croatia in 2000, the current situation can best be described as the “consolidation of unconsolidated democracies.”3 The latest edition of the Nations in Transit report presents a record of backsliding and stagnation in all key governance indicators across all the countries of the region.4 While liberal democratic Western Balkan governments seem to identify with the EU, they often remain overshadowed by the high number of domestic formal and informal “gate keeper” elites that continue to control the state in an effort to preserve their private economic interests and their grip on political power.5 The reconciliation after the violent conflicts of the 1990s is still not fully achieved, while a climate of revenge, fear and hatred still drives decisions of the political elites and, more importantly, the attitudes of common people. Bilateral relationships, particularly between Serbia and
Kosovo and Macedonia and Greece, remain overburdened by historical legacies, and threaten to export tension to the level of regional cooperation as well. While the dynamics of the EU integration seem to announce a new phase in regional relations, relapse into the doctrine of the ethnically pure state and ethnic extremism is all but impossible. Moreover, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo-notwithstanding the latter’s
declaration of independence in 2008-remain internationally administered territories.6 Macedonia managed to avoid a full-scale war and to reduce interethnic tensions with the mostly successful implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement of 2001, but the political system is not fully consolidated,7
while the countries’ Euro-Atlantic integration is consistently vetoed by Greece due to the mutual name issue dispute. After the dissolution of the common state with Montenegro in 2006 and Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008, Serbia is currently in the hands of “reformed” Miloševic´ allies who have turned pro-European. At the same time its political elites are searching for a way to escape the dilemmas over state-and nationhood issues. Having gained independence in 2006, Montenegro has nearly completed the state-building processes. However, the country’s newly achieved independence did not result in a swift resolution of key challenges, such as weak governance and widely perceived corruption.8 Albania did not take part in the violent ex-Yugoslav wars and therefore had an easier path towards democratic consolidation than the countries analyzed above, but it has nonetheless undergone a very slow democratic and economic transition hampered by the internal political polarization of the ruling elites, the dominant influence of informal centers of power, and high levels of corruption throughout all branches of government.9
