ABSTRACT
On 25 July 1994, Jordan and Israel signed the Washington Declaration, which ended the official state of belligerence between them since the foundation of the State of Israel in 1948. Three months later, a full-fledged peace treaty was signed between representatives of both countries in the Arava valley in the south of Jordan. The ceremony was attended by world leaders and key figures whose hopes for peace in the region were high and, seemingly at the time, well-founded. It seemed that the Arab-Israeli conflict was ending at last, having reached a hurtful stalemate that made a peaceful resolution to the conflict the only viable option. Jordan was the second Arab state, after Egypt, to sign a peace treaty with Israel; but in many ways, the treaty was unique. Peace with Egypt was concluded under the pressure of renewed hostilities, snatched from the teeth of opposition from other Arab countries in a world dominated by the cold war. Consequently, security arrangements in Sinai were at the centre of this peace treaty, with normalization serving as a bargaining card for the Egyptians. Peace with Jordan, on the other hand, was concluded after years of quiet dialogue and tacit understandings, with legitimacy provided by Madrid and Oslo, and in a world whose beacons were globalization, interdependence and the market. Accordingly, as Shimon Shamir pointed out, the treaty said little about security and a great deal about economic cooperation (Shlaim 2001: 544). Above all, it bore the seeds of a warm peace. Articles 5, 6 and 10 of the Jordan-Israel treaty of peace make explicit reference to normalization in the diplomatic, economic, cultural and scientific spheres. This was not only a treaty that set out obligations and rights, but it also provided a blueprint for complete normalization along all levels and in all spheres.
