ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the relationship between development and democracy in Iraq. We examine in particular the two variables that Elbadawi and Makdisi posit as critical in explaining the ‘Arab democracy deficit’. The first variable emphasizes the pervasive impact of war and conflict in the Arab world as an impediment to democratic rule, while the second argues for the negative impact of oil wealth, understood as ‘rentierism’ (Elbadawi and Makdisi, 2007). Here, we survey and analyse trends in economic growth and development over the past half-century, and evaluate trends in democratization and political rights. We then assess the effects of oil, notably in relation to the theory of the rentier state, and the impact of war – especially the Iran-Iraq war (1980-8) and the Gulf war of 1991 – on democratization. If considered in isolation, oil and war possess only limited ability to explain why Iraq has not experienced greater democratization, so we attempt to expand the Elbadawi-Makdisi model. We conclude by offering a number of supplemental hypotheses, such as the manner in which the Iraqi nationalist movement of the pre-Ba’athist era and the political economy of identity have intersected with the two variables emphasized by the Elbadawi-Makdisi model. By placing the model in a larger context, we seek to enhance its ability to account for the lack of democratization in Iraq.
