ABSTRACT
ButthemainpointisagainParmenides'text.Itseemsonlytooclear thatParmenides'epistemologicaloppositionbetweenTruthanddoxa (dokeO)ismuchmoreseverethanthatofXenophanes(B34and35):he constantlyopposesthedoxatotruebelief(whileXenophanesadmitsthat mortalsmayhold,accidentally,sometrueopinion,althoughtheywould notknowit),andheemphaticallydeclaresthat,accordingtotruth,aworld ofmotion,ofchange,andofplurality,isimpossible.Sowhenthegenesisof thisimpossibleworldisexplained,itisexplicitlydescribedasduetoa mistake.Thesepassagesare,Ifeel,decisive,andthereisnoneedtoquarrel aboutthequestionwhetherthegoddesscharacterizesherowndescription ofthisimpossibleworldofchangeas'adeceptiveorderofmywords'(which seemstomethecorrectrendering)oras'atrickyorderofmywords'(asde Santillanasuggests).Icannotbutfeelthatthetendencyofthetextis unmistakable:thedoxaarethedelusionsofthemortal,whichmustbe explained(andexplainedaway).JustasReasonisopposedtothesenses (whichareutterlyrejectedinB7),soTruthisopposedtodoxa.Thusthe doxaarerejectedalso-andinnouncertainmanner.Theyaredelusionsin Parmenidesandhisimmediatesuccessorsratherthanconjectures;andthey arerestoredtothestatusofconjecturesbytheidealistPlato.
