ABSTRACT

What makes deconstruction with compassion Buddhist? For that matter, what makes a deconstruction compassionate? The best way to approach those questions is with some examples. This chapter focuses on two different types of deconstruction, both with obvious ethical implications: the deconstruction of antithetical concepts, especially the dualism between good and evil; and the deconstruction of (sense of) self, implied by the Buddhist critique of anattā. If Derridean deconstruction emphasizes the former, Buddhism emphasizes the latter. Of course, the two types are inextricably related, and in the context of this chapter any deconstruction of the self will be conceptual. Nevertheless, the distinction between concept and self is important because for Buddhism it is not enough to grasp that our sense of self is a construct: any such understanding needs to be embodied in the ways we live in the world. It is our lives that most need to be deconstructed and reconstructed.