ABSTRACT
This chapter determines what it is that is said to be true or false in the Avicennian system, and what are the conditions that are necessary to call those items "true" or "false". It shows that truth-values are typically ascribed to linguistic items, and in particular to those expressions where a speaker asserts there to be a relation between two matters, thereby claiming to provide 'information' about them. The chapter distinguishes these expressions from others in the language, and shows that, strictly speaking, this distinction requires that the expression in question be such as to succeed in eliciting a response from the audience. It draws on Avicenna's psychological work to help elucidate the meanings of the key terms 'conception' and 'judgement'. The chapter discusses preparatory to understanding how Avicenna viewed logic, and it lays the ground for beginning to see in what sense – if at all – logic for him can be considered to be an 'instrument for knowledge'.
