ABSTRACT
When Russell spoke of logic’s beginnings, he specifi cally meant ‘logical forms’. He knew that logicians cannot cut themselves off from metaphysics, since they also study objects and their properties. Modern logicians, however, seem to live by the proverb ‘Take care of the Ps and their forms will take care of themselves’. For it is a curious fact that although there is plenty of (rather inconsequential) debate about the constituents of argumentswhether sentences, statements or propositions-it is rare to fi nd a proper discussion of form. Yet form is what logic is all about. What limited discussion there now is often displays all the hallmarks of primitive, inchoate conceptualization. It is riddled with toxic ambiguity and shrouded with dark sayings and oppositions: ‘grammatical form misleads as to logical form’, ‘apparent, surface, overt form vs real, deep, hidden form’, and ‘valid arguments are valid in virtue of their form, not their matter’. Here I try to clear some of the ground.
