ABSTRACT
Two main trends in contemporary philosophy of mind, language and action are ‘naturalism’ and ‘internalism’. This chapter argues that Kant’s Critical philosophy identifies systematic deficiencies, both methodological and substantive, in both trends. Contemporary naturalists purport to offer causal theories of human mindedness, language or behaviour, including causal deterministic explanations of human action. Kant’s Critical philosophy shows instead that causal ‘theories’ of the mind and the problem of the apparent conflict between freedom of action and natural causal determinism have not been properly framed, because their key premiss – the thesis of universal causal determinism – is, in the domain of human behaviour, an unjustified conjecture based upon over-simplified, under-informed explanatory models. Kant’s semantics of singular cognitive reference stands independently of his transcendental idealism, and justifies distinguishing between causal description, causal ascription (predication), (approximately) true causal ascription (accurate predication), and cognitively justified causal ascription (cognitively justified belief or knowledge). Contemporary causal theories of mind, of meaning and of action do not suffice for causal ascription, and so cannot suffice for causal predication, and hence cannot justify causal determinism about human behaviour, nor causal ‘theories’ of human mindedness or action. More generally, the principle of universal causal determinism is a regulative principle governing causal inquiry, and was so formulated by LaPlace. Only successful, sufficient causal explanation of particular events provides for causal knowledge of those events. Such knowledge we lack in the domain of human mindedness and behaviour. Rational belief, including scientific belief, requires apportioning belief to justifying evidence; all else is conjecture or speculation, which do not justify premises of proofs. Causal explanation of, and causal determinism about, human behaviour remain unjustified speculation, for sound Critical reasons Kant provided us in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Conversely, the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness and strong internalism about mental content or linguistic meaning are, in principle, not merely Cartesian, but demonstrably Mediaeval. In both regards, far too much contemporary debate in philosophy of mind, of language and of action remains decidedly and deficiently pre-Critical.
