ABSTRACT
Sigmund Freud's thought sounds as though it has a commonsensical, or face-value, meaning. It expresses, for example, one's awe at what one sees, or, contra Freud, one's observation of the difference between seeing something and hearing or reading about it. A greater number of common-sense readings of the thought exist than Freud considers. One or more of them might account for the thought, as it occurs in general or even as it occurred to Freud. The chapter describes whether commonsensical contexts can account for the thought literally. The example captures the setting of the thought in which most people imagine it to occur, namely one's confrontation with famous, historical objects. Interpretations that attempt to dilute the thought's allusion to a doubt about the object's existence do not produce the thought. The literal interpretation of Freud's thought seems to pose a problem that does not arise with the literal interpretation of other expressions.
