ABSTRACT
The difficulty of face-value interpretation of the thought apparent, Sigmund Freud's psychodynamic account of the thought assumes interest. This chapter analyzes the account to assess whether it, or something like it, might be extended to the general case of the thought. Freud believed that all human behavior, except for genuinely accidental behavior, which he thought occurred rarely, made sense, within some (psychological) context. The chapter considers the cogency of this account for Freud's own experience of the thought and the potential applicability of the account to the general case of the thought. Freud's account of how the thought might have responded to his guilt is curious. The problems with Freud's account become magnified when one tries to extend the account to the general case. Freud remarks that his own circumstance may have been idiosyncratic. Freud recounts the story of a patient whom he had diagnosed as suffering from delusional jealousy.
