ABSTRACT
In this chapter, the author begins with a preliminary account that, although inadequate in itself, will serve as a basis for elaborating the account that she wish to entertain more seriously. Sigmund Freud's account holds the advantage that it explains how the thought might address a doubt when in fact the person had no doubt. Applied to the general case, the account says, in effect, that through a defensive process occurring within them, people may generate an irrational doubt. Freud's idea that the impetus to his thought lay in his "derealization" indirectly suggests a possibility. That possibility builds upon the prospect that a derealization may occur in conjunction with the thought, even though this derealization may not, contrary to Freud's proposal, explain the thought. The chapter suggests that a feeling of unreality does accompany the thought, as it did in Freud's case. The thought seems to be purely affirmatory, despite its allusion to a doubt or question.
