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      Chapter

      Pseudorandom Bits and Sequences
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      Chapter

      Pseudorandom Bits and Sequences

      DOI link for Pseudorandom Bits and Sequences

      Pseudorandom Bits and Sequences book

      Pseudorandom Bits and Sequences

      DOI link for Pseudorandom Bits and Sequences

      Pseudorandom Bits and Sequences book

      ByAlfred J. Menezes, Paul C. van Oorschot, Scott A. Vanstone
      BookHandbook of Applied Cryptography

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      Edition 1st Edition
      First Published 1997
      Imprint CRC Press
      Pages 22
      eBook ISBN 9780429466335
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      ABSTRACT

      The security of many cryptographic systems depends upon the generation of unpredictable quantities. Examples include the keystream in the one-time pad (§1.5.4), the secret key in the DES encryption algorithm (§7.4.2), the primes p, q in the RSA encryption (§8.2) and digital signature (§11.3.1) schemes, the private key a in the DSA (§11.5.1), and the challenges used in challenge-response identification systems (§10.3). In all these cases, the quantities generated must be of sufficient size and be “random” in the sense that the probability of any particular value being selected must be sufficiently small to preclude an adversary from gaining advantage through optimizing a search strategy based on such probability. For example, the key space for DES has size 256. If a secret key k were selected using a true random generator, an adversary would on average have to try 255 possible keys before guessing the correct key k. If, on the other hand, a key k were selected by first choosing a 16-bit random secret s, and then expanding it into a 56-bit key k using a complicated but publicly known function f, the adversary would on average only need to try 215 possible keys (obtained by running every possible value for s through the function f).

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