ABSTRACT
The problem of other minds is among the most difficult questions in the philosophy of mind. How can we be sure that other individuals share the same psycho-logical framework with us? If we see a grimace of pain on another person’s face, can we be sure that they are suffering as we would if we have the same facial expression? This kind of problems requires complicated answers, which often prove unsatisfying. Moreover, what about the problem of other minds when such minds are artificial? The chapter addresses these questions, suggesting that while most of the feelings we have about robots are inspired by fear or a desire to enslave them, the best approach would actually be one inspired by trust. Trust in robots, on the other hand, is a feeling that may have a natural basis. In particular, anthropomorphism – when properly understood – is a constructive sentiment that can ground the relationship between humans and robots. In the last part of the chapter, this kind of reasoning is analyzed in some very delicate cases, such as weapons that can kill without human choice, and the sentimental and sexual relationship with sex robots.
