ABSTRACT

Within all major civilizations, there are always a few reflective individuals whose hard-nosed, pragmatic views of war and politics focus on military strategy, domestic and political intelligence, and the problems of enforcing the law of the land. Worldwide examples are Machiavelli’s 16th century Italian The Prince; 152 in India, during the time of the great epic, the Mahābhārata and Kautilya’s Arthaśāstra; 153 and in ancient China, Sun Tzu’s The Art of War (“Skills of the Soldier”). 154 At Asian organized crime conferences, usually in the bar in the late afternoon, some naturally curious, energetic officer who has been reading about Asian cultures may bring up the famous Chinese book on strategy and warfare, The Art of War, wondering whether it is worth reading to understand “the Chinese mindset”. Perhaps someone else has seen the new translation and commentary on other ancient Chinese strategists, The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China. 155 Another officer may have read a translation of the famous Thirty-Six Stratagems 156 and wonder if they bear upon the way Asian organized crime is conducted. Since the influence of these works has been and remains substantial in China, Japan, and Korea, their content and relevance deserve our attention. However, at the other end of the scale are found more exotic claims about Chinese strategic thought, which deserve at least a debunking warning.