ABSTRACT
A successful total-site water integration (TSWI) project should be facilitated by not only an optimal design of multi-plant water network (MPWN) but also a “fair” revenue-sharing scheme. The proposed approach to address both issues is implemented in two stages. The minimum total annual cost (TAC) of every potential coalition on an industrial park is first determined according to two different design strategies. One is to synthesize the MPWN directly based on the process data of all existing water-using units, while the other is to produce the optimal single-plant WNs first and then integrate them into an MPWN. The benefit allocation problem is dealt with in the second stage on the basis of three criteria of the cooperative game theory, i.e., the core, the Shapley value, and the risk-based Shapley value. A definite portion of the TAC saving of the MPWN can be determined at designated time intervals for allocation to each plant by considering both its contribution level and also the risk of potential fallouts of unexpected plant shutdowns in a coalition. It should also be noted that, since the plant life is viewed as a random variable that follows the exponential distribution in this chapter, the corresponding risk-based Shapley value is time dependent. An appropriate MPWN design and the corresponding benefit-allocation plan can be chosen for a designated period of time. The proposed methodology is illustrated with a simple example.
