ABSTRACT
SUM MARY. Much of the work of illegal logging in Indonesia is car ried out by villagers. Several factors determine villagers’ willingness to
participate in such activities. Chief among these are: (1) the need for in come, (2) the fact that other villagers (and non-villagers) are already ille gally logging, and (3) the realization of loss of community control over traditional forest areas. These factors form the basis of feedback loops, which trap villagers in illegal logging systems, which will likely result in the disappearance of a major source of livelihood. Ideas for system dy namics model structure were obtained from field reports and interviews with stakeholders. These ideas were examined using causal loop dia grams to represent different views of illegal logging. One village level view was formulated as a quantified system dynamics model using Vensim software. The model allows examination of scenarios, which might alter system behavior. The model is a tool for understanding con sequences of various proposed strategies to control illegal logging. These strategies include enforcement of laws, strengthening of commu nity rights, the prevention of outside labor in local forests, and the provi sion of alternate sources of income. This is part of a larger effort to describe and analyze illegal logging using system dynamics modeling. [Article copies available fo r a fee from The Haworth Document Delivery Ser vice: 1-800-HAWORTH. E-mail address: <docdelivery@haworthpress.com> Website: <https://www.HaworthPress.com>; © 2004 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved.]
KEYW ORDS. System dynamics modeling, illegal logging, Indonesia, villagers
INTRODUCTION The decline of Indonesian forests is well documented. In 1997 and 1998,
during the first phases of Indonesia’s economic crisis, between 3 and 50% of Indonesian timber harvest was unaccounted for in official statistics (Palmer, 2001; Scotland et al., 2000). Illegal logging was thought to account for a large portion of this shortfall. Prior to 1997 Indonesian forests were disappearing at the rate of almost 1.6 million ha per year, equivalent to an annual decline of 1.5% (World Bank, 2001). Annual rate of decline was more rapid within Su matra (2.8%) and Kalimantan (1.9%). Several reports indicate significant in creases in illegal logging since 1998 (e.g., McCarthy, 2000; Obidzinski and Suramenggala, 2000; Casson, 2000), so the rate of forest loss has presumably increased considerably.
