ABSTRACT
It is clear that the Fukushima reactors’ abilities to maintain cooling in the event of a prolonged loss of power and to vent dangerous gas buildups were insuffi cient, as were the operators ability to respond to large scale emergencies and the regulators’ degree of independence from the nuclear industry (Bunn and Heinonen 2011). Reactor operators should be required to be better prepared for disaster such as fl oods and earthquakes, as well as for any events that cause a prolonged loss of electrical power. Regulators should reassess whether design bases refl ect the spectrum of plausible disasters requiring safety backfi ts where necessary and should also require operators to plan responses to events beyond plants’ design basis. Reactor operators need to install fi ltered vents, thus reducing the amount of radiation released if a dangerous pressure buildup in the reactors requires venting of gases. Other safety measures recommended include prevention of spent fuels from melting or burning and proper storing of spent fuels. There is also a need for more stringent standards for protecting nuclear facilities against terrorist sabotage. It is emphasized that a nuclear facility cannot be considered safe, in the sense of posing little risk to humans and the environment unless it also secure. Stronger emergency responses from local police, fi re and emergency departments are recommended with regular and realistic exercises to make sure that all key players are aware of their role in a nuclear emergency. Creation of an international emergency response team that is interoperable both domestically and internationally is recommended with management by the nuclear industry (Bunn and Heinonen 2011).
