ABSTRACT
It might seem as though human errors-“actions other than those desired” (Konz, 1995, p. 138)—represent the dark side of human performance variability. This chapter will argue otherwise. Specifically, sections below note that analyses of human error embody both empiricist and nativist interpretations, in line with the dichotomy introduced in Chapter 1 (Goldhaber, 2012) (Section 6.3); from the empiricist perspective, most if not all incidents of human error feature some degree of context specificity (Section 6.3); consequently, human error represents an inherent attribute of human performance variability (Section 6.4); human error can be interpreted from a control systems perspective (Section 6.5); scientifically, there is a remarkable inconsistency and discordance in evaluations of the nature and sources of human error on the part of different human factors and safety professionals-arguably, this calls into question the validity of the term “human error” as a meaningful scientific and operational concept (Section 6.6); and a focus on management and control of system hazards, rather than on analysis of human error, offers a more promising opportunity for reducing risks contributing to, and for mitigating the consequences of, adverse system events and failures (portions of this chapter adapted from T.J. Smith [2002]).
