ABSTRACT
Inthe mid-1990s, the Livermore Forensic Science Center was tasked to perform“counterforensic” sampling atthe US gaseous diffusion facilities conducting Uisotopic enrichment. The plants were under consideration for inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the purposes of international safeguardsand accountability. The concern of US authorities was whether an inspector with an alternate agenda could learn secret information through analyses of environmentalsamples of opportunity collected surreptitiously atthe sites. The LLNL Forensic Science Center (FSC) therefore conducted amodest sampling campaign to evaluate the magnitude of potential risk to sensitive information and technology from such accessibility. Although ageneral objective of the exercise was the broad assessment of plant vulnerabilities, acollateral nuclear forensic investigation of the US Special Nuclear Material production complex was also successfully executed. More detail may be found in Chapter 21.
