ABSTRACT
The publication of the rst article on crime-terror in 1999 was the starting point of a long, controversial, and intense debate-among academics, practitioners, and policymakers-that complemented the parallel observations of changes occurring in wars, insurgency, and military interventions. The ability of organized criminals and terrorists (including groups and networks) to progressively increase their performance at a global level, to establish their headquarters inside failed (and failing) and weak states, and to interact with other groups that violently oppose the state-namely insurgents and paramilitaries-deserves to be evaluated within a more comprehensive theoretical framework. Undoubtedly, empirical analysis are complicated by the sensitivity of the topic and the difculty in obtaining and using reliable data. Nevertheless, the use of terror tactics by criminals for securing the environments in which they act and the exploitation of illicit markets by terrorists for funding are largely becoming visible manifestations as well as interactions with insurgents. Thus, the phenomenon needs to be reconceptualized in order to include more exible features and to understand the reason(s) why it requires a collective response.
