Safety culture The rst use of the term safety culture is generally ascribed to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, 1986) report of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the cause of which was attributed to a breakdown in the organization’s safety culture. Subsequently, a number of other major disasters that were subject to detailed independent public inquiry also revealed the signicant role played by organizational and social factors (Reason, 1990). The term safety culture was quoted by several inquiry reports as an explanation for the way that a combination of managerial, organizational, and social factors contributed to the disasters. These included the Kings Cross underground station re (Fennell, 1988), the Clapham Junction rail disaster (Hidden, 1989), and the North Sea platform Piper Alpha explosion (Cullen, 1990). The idea of safety culture was highlighted for a broader range of organizations, including those involved in transportation and public safety, as well as the nuclear industry. It has continued to appear as a substantive issue in accident inquiry reports over the past 30 years. For example, the term appeared 10 times in the Special Commission of Inquiry Interim Report into the Waterfall rail disaster (McInerney, 2004), 70 times in the Glenbrook Rail Accident report (McInerney, 2001), and 26 times in the President’s Commission Report into the Deepwater Horizon accident (National Commission, 2011). The concept of safety culture has also generated a considerable amount of academic research, debate, and discussion (e.g., Clarke, 2000; Cox & Flin, 1998; Glendon, 2008; Guldenmund, 2000, 2010).