ABSTRACT
The end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Soviet Union (dissolved in 1991) as a result of domestic pressures did not lead to the ‘end of history’, or the ‘peace dividend’, foretold by some of the more superficial commentators who believed all too readily that it represented a triumph for American-led democratic capitalism and that there would be no future clash of ideologies to destabilize the world. However, in what was a revolution in strategic affairs, the Western powers, led by the USA, were now able to intervene more frequently against states that earlier would otherwise have looked for Soviet support, not least because UN resolutions were not vetoed in the Security Council. In addition, the established parameters within which peacekeeping was generally expected to take place, particularly that conflict had already ended and that the government of the state in question accepted the deployment of peacekeepers, were interpreted increasingly generously, as seen with the use of terms such as ‘peace support’, ‘peace-making’ and ‘peace-enforcement’.
