ABSTRACT
We saw in the last section of the previous chapter that Wittgenstein dismissed the idea of a subject or self, as that is conceived of in ‘contemporary superficial psychology’ (5.5421). That suggests that there might be a subject or self of an altogether different kind, which plays a rather different role in philosophy. And, in a sense, that seems to be just what Wittgenstein thinks, though even to say that is to court controversy. The problem is crystallized in this remark:
Solipsism, traditionally understood, is the view that only the self (‘solus ipse’) exists: nothing but the self is real. It is not clear, however, that this is quite Wittgenstein’s view, or that
he is concerned with it — to put the point no less ambiguously — for precisely the traditional reasons. Wittgenstein here seems to be making three distinct claims:
To begin with, at least, I will take these claims as literally as possible. The question will then be to understand why Wittgenstein makes them. This will show what kind of ‘solipsism’ he has in mind, and will also reveal something of the character of the Tractatus as a whole. Wittgenstein’s discussion in the Tractatus of the view he
calls ‘solipsism’ is very brief, but might be claimed to be the centrepiece of the whole work.1 In the single dramatic remark I have just quoted we might seem to have the fulfilment of the aim of the book as that is stated in the Preface:
I have suggested that the book can be seen to be a reaction against Kant’s approach to metaphysics — in particular, against the view that philosophical truths are synthetic a priori truths. It is tempting to see the dramatic claim of 5.62 as a moving on from Kant’s whole philosophy.
