ABSTRACT
As we have seen, and will see further, the philosophy of ‘what we say’ has been challenged in various ways. A curious feature of some of these ways is that they are themselves based on arguments from what we say. (This is so in the case of sceptical arguments, as I tried to show in Chapter 7, where I spoke of the ordinary concept of knowledge as having ‘suicidal tendencies’.) A particularly interesting case in this connection is that of H.P. Grice, who belonged to the generation of Oxford philosophers with which the ordinary language approach is usually associated. In an article on ‘Postwar Oxford Philosophy’ he expressed his (qualified) sympathy with this approach and, especially, for what he called ‘conceptual analysis’.1 The appeal to ‘what we would say’ is prominent in Grice’s work, as we shall see; yet he arrived at conclusions that are clearly and admittedly contrary to what we would say. His way of defending these conclusions has been a powerful influence in the widespread rejection of that philosophy.
