ABSTRACT
Our task in this chapter is to investigate in more detail the dualist conception of the soul as an individually existing thing, whose existence is independent of the existence of the body. We shall consider what answers a dualist might give to two related questions: (1) Under what conditions would a particular disembodied soul after my death be my soul? (2) What would fundamentally distinguish different disembodied souls from one another? Question (1) will form the topic of section ii, and question (2) will form the topic of section iii. But since they both in fact involve the concepts of identity and distinctness, we shall begin by trying to elucidate these. There are a number of points and distinctions to be introduced. Some of them may seem insignificant, but will later turn out to be of the highest importance. (Indeed our ultimate objective will be to construct, in section iii, a proof of the non-existence of the soul.)
