ABSTRACT
For much of the 1990s NATO would be focused on four consequences of victory. First, re-assessing the value of American leadership; second, adjusting to collective security; third, considering the balance between effectiveness and legitimacy in promoting security; and, fourth, striking a balance between European aspirations and European
capabilities. Indeed, the 1990s would be a security experiment for Europe. Indeed, as the Cold War ends the complexity of constructing the European political edifice leads to a form of European isolationism precisely because Europe becomes so focused on building its own shining city on the hill with its very regional sense of manifest destiny:2 a work in progress that is still under way. NATO ceases to be the macro-defense shield of the West, and becomes instead the micromanager of instability and insecurity across the Continent. To that end, NATO must both organize military cohesion, and incorporate political fragmentation, and all on a markedly reduced budget. Furthermore, there is also an underlying political dynamic as France, in particular, sees an opportunity finally to shape Europe, for the benefit of France. And of course, France and Germany seek to embed themselves firmly at the heart of the ideal of European political union. It is a démarche that will reinforce divide between the Europeanist and Atlanticist camps within the West and which shapes much of the debate today.
